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Introduction 
This commentary looks at the (macro-economic) stabilisation properties of a potential 
European unemployment benefits scheme (EUBS). Any such scheme would of course involve 
many other aspects, both political and economic; for instance, it could be argued that an EUBS, 
especially one that pays benefits directly to individuals, would constitute a powerful 
illustration of the benefits of ‘Europe’. It might also be argued that the creation of an EUBS 
could foster the upward convergence of unemployment systems. But these issues are not 
considered here. 
Our concentration on the stabilisation aspect points to one direct implication: emphasis should 
be placed on the short-term unemployed. But the short-term unemployed make up ‘only’ about 
one-half of total unemployment at present. It is thus clear that the stabilisation aspect can cover 
only a part of the overall unemployment problem. Moreover, the share of the short-term 
unemployed varies greatly over time and across countries. 
This paper does not advocate the creation of an EUBS; it merely investigates the stabilisation 
properties of such a system, and as such constitutes a companion to “A European 
Unemployment Benefits Scheme: The rationale and the challenges ahead”,1 which makes 
ample reference to the vast academic literature on this issue. 
EUBS ≠ EUBS 
A European unemployment benefits scheme could take so many different forms that it is 
impossible to generalise about its stabilisation properties. The two main conceptual types are: 
Reinsurance or ‘equivalent’ schemes. Under this approach, there are no transfers to 
individuals or from individual economic units to the EUBS. Rather, financial transfers from 
                                                   
1 M. Beblavý, G. Marconi and I. Maselli (2015), CEPS Special Report No. 119, CEPS, Brussels, September 
(www.ceps.eu/system/files/CEPS%20SR%20No%20119%20EUBS_0.pdf). 
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the EUBS occur only from and towards member states (or officially designated national funds 
dealing with the unemployed), usually only when triggered by a major adverse event. Under 
the re-insurance approach, the EUBS does not replace national schemes in any way, but rather 
‘re-insures’ them. 
Genuine schemes. Under this approach, the EUBS would pay benefits to unemployed 
individuals directly, and contributions would be collected by the EUBS directly from 
employers and employees. Genuine schemes therefore at least partially replace national 
schemes (of course, only for the short-term unemployed, if one considers the stabilisation 
impact). 
In principle, the distinction between these two types is clear, but in reality, they could be 
implemented in many different forms. The CEPS study cited above considered 18 variants, but 
even more could have been considered.2 
Key political issues 
Moral hazard 
This is a fundamental problem. It is common to all unemployment benefits systems, and 
indeed all insurance schemes. If the EUBS pays out in the case of unemployment, then 
beneficiaries will make less effort to avoid unemployment. 
The best way to take care of this problem seems to be experience rating, which is widely 
practised in the US. The basic principle of experience rating is simple: insurance rates go up 
for countries and sectors with high unemployment rates and/or frequent use of the system. If 
the link between the frequency of the benefits and contribution rates is appropriately 
calibrated, the moral hazard disappears. Participants in the system know that if they make less 
effort to avoid unemployment, they might benefit more often, but their contributions would 
go up accordingly, leaving them without any net benefit.   
Experience rating is used in the US at the level of the firms. It is a key reason why the US 
unemployment benefit system, which is organised and financed by the individual states, can 
cope with large variations in conditions across states and sectors. The federal level provides 
support for individual states only in the event of a generalised recession and even these so-
called extended benefits can later be ‘clawed’ back.  In the US, the financing of unemployment 
insurance has thus essentially remained at the state level. 
(Permanent) transfers 
There seems to be general agreement that any EUBS should avoid permanent transfers across 
member states. In genuine systems there are no transfers to member states, but the perception 
of net transfers to individual member states occurs when individuals in these states 
experience, on average, higher unemployment rates. 
The CEPS study shows that, in practice, the problem might be less severe than one might first 
assume, given the huge differences in economic conditions between the core and the periphery 
of the euro area today.  Both backward- and forward-looking simulation analyses suggest that, 
in the long run, few member states are always likely to perform better or worse than the 
average. With such reversals in economic fortunes over several decades, few member states 
remain large net contributors or beneficiaries. 
Moreover, as argued above, experience rating could eliminate net transfers over time. If 
experience rating is too weak to prevent the accumulation of large imbalances, another 
                                                   
2 Ibid. 
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provision, also used in the US, namely claw-backs, could be applied. A claw-back is the 
requirement to pay back net receipts after a certain period. The use of this type of clause would 
ensure that net large transfers are compensated.  But the ‘claw’, or pay-back, might be difficult 
to implement for genuine systems (individuals would have to pay back potentially large sums 
into the system).  
The mechanisms that would impede permanent transfers should, in principle, have little 
impact on the potential stabilisation benefits because they would operate in the long run. 
Legal issues 
Legal experts seem to be divided on the question of whether the creation of an EUBS would 
require treaty revision. There seems to be general agreement that the legal issues are less of a 
problem for the re-insurance option. René Repasi, the legal expert involved in the project on 
the “Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme”, reached the 
conclusion that a treaty revision might not be needed if there were sufficient political will.  
In his view, a combination of Articles 175(3) and 352(1) TFEU (with possibly a different legal 
basis for collecting benefits and paying out) could serve to establish a genuine system. For 
equivalent systems the purpose would be only stabilisation, and Article 352(1) TFEU could 
provide a legal basis.  
The creation of a genuine system that replaces at least partially existing national systems 
would clearly require significant legal changes at the national level. It is less clear what the 
legal consequences for equivalent systems, i.e. the re-insurance option, would be at the 
national level.  
Stabilisation 
Conceptual issues 
The discussion on stabilisation often conflates two aspects: 
Spatial: the reallocation of resources across member states within the same period, which does 
not require the ability to issue debt because it only entails the distribution of resources 
available at any point in time. Spatial insurance works well at covering the asymmetric shocks 
in small- and medium-sized countries, but the effectiveness in cases of both symmetric and 
asymmetric shocks in a significant proportion of the EU economy is quite limited.  
Inter-temporal: the reallocation of resources across time. This type of stabilisation can be 
achieved if the EUBS can go into deficit at times of recession while accumulating funds in good 
times. Debt issuance might be needed in this case, unless a large starting fund were available. 
Inter-temporal insurance is important for major symmetric or extended downturns.  
Not necessarily from poor to rich member states 
If one concentrates on systems that exclude permanent transfers, stabilisation would consist 
of temporary transfers from the EUBS to those countries that are worse off in terms of 
unemployment, but not necessarily in terms of income. Logic dictates that one would expect 
that the transfer would be from poorer to richer countries in roughly 50% of the transfers.    
Stabilisation in theory, simulations 
The CEPS study simulated the stabilisation impact of all 18 variants, using both the actual data 
(GDP, (un)employment, etc.) over the last year and on a forward-looking basis using a macro-
economic model. The general finding from these simulations is that the stabilisation impact 
depends hugely on some key parameters:  
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1. For genuine schemes more generosity, meaning looser eligibility criteria or higher 
coverage or higher replacement rates, leads to higher gross and net flows (in both 
directions. This also implies a higher stabilisation effect.  
2. A higher degree of stabilisation in general implies a greater need for debt issuance or the 
accumulation of more pre-funding. 
3. Re-insurance usually implies lower gross flows, but can have a bigger impact in the rare 
event of big recessions. 
Stabilisation in reality and a rule of thumb  
It is surprisingly difficult to find reliable data on how much member states spend on 
unemployment benefits. Each country has a different way of calculating them and the actual 
pay-out is organised in many different ways.  The only data that are comparable across 
countries comes from an OECD database and essentially covers the period between 2008 and 
2012.  There does not seem to be any comparable, cross-country data source with expenditure 
on the short-term unemployed, which would be key for the stabilisation issue addressed here.  
The available data thus conflate the short-term and long-term unemployed. It suggests that, in 
reality, the link between unemployment and unemployment expenditure is tenuous.  Figure 
1 below,\ shows the data for 2012 (the latest year for which complete data are available). Each 
point denotes the combination of the national unemployment rate and the amount spent on 
unemployment benefits (as a % of GDP).  There is no reliable relationship between these two 
variables (technically the correlation coefficient is not statistically significant). The data for 
other years would show a similar picture. 
Figure 1. Unemployment rate versus expenditure on unemployed as % of GDP (2012) 
 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD and Eurostat data. 
This lack of a relationship between overall unemployment rates and total spending on all the 
unemployed (both short- and long-term) is important because it shows that the 
unemployment systems of different member states serve very different purposes, and thus 
lead to very different expenditures. For example, Belgium has the highest level of expenditure 
on the unemployed although its unemployment rate is below the EU average, because its 
system is rather generous and supports the long-term unemployed with no time limit. This 
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implies that in Belgium unemployment benefits largely represent general social support 
expenditure.  Other countries have stricter eligibility limits, so the long-term unemployed 
receive support under different income support programmes. 
When one looks at the data over time, however, one can find a link between changes in the 
unemployment rate and changes in expenditure on unemployment benefits. For the larger 
member states a pattern emerges, if one considers the five years for which data are available 
(2008-12), as shown in Figure 2 below. 
Figure 2.  Unemployment expenditure and the business cycle  
 
Source: Own calculations on OECD and Eurostat data. 
From this figure one observes that there is a reasonably close relationship between the 
unemployment rate and expenditure on the unemployed, looking at developments over time. 
It is clear that this relationship differs greatly from country to country, however.  Among the 
large member states in Figure 2 one finds, somewhat surprisingly, that the UK and Italy show 
a very similar pattern in terms of expenditure on unemployment, although it is widely thought 
that the unemployment benefits systems of these two countries are very different. 
Another group is France, Germany and Spain, in which the case of Spain is especially 
interesting. As long as the business cycle was favourable, that country’s pattern fell into the 
Franco-German group.  But when unemployment shot up, expenditure no longer increased. 
This is why Spain also shows a cluster inside which expenditure did not increase above a 
certain level once unemployment reached a very high level. More research is needed to 
understand whether this was due to constraints on the budget, or whether more and more of 
the unemployed became ineligible for benefits as their unemployment spell lengthened. 
Figure 2 also suggests that, on average, a one-percentage point increase in unemployment 
leads to an increase in spending of about 0.1% of GDP. This is more a rule of thumb than a 
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precise relationship, but it seems to describe what some of the larger member states have done 
in the past (this rule thus abstracts from the huge variations across all member states.) 
This rule of thumb allows one to calculate very roughly an order of magnitude of the potential 
macroeconomic stabilisation properties of an EUBS in the usual terms, i.e. as a percentage of 
any shock to GDP that would, on average, be absorbed. 
1. In genuine schemes (i.e. without thresholds), only 5% of shocks to GDP would be offset by 
an EUBS. This result can easily be obtained by applying a so-called Okun coefficient (a link 
between GDP growth and the unemployment rate) of two. A fall in GDP of 1% should thus 
be associated with an increase in unemployment of about 0.5%. Given the rule of thumb 
that unemployment benefits expenditure as a share of GDP increases by about 0.1 % of 
GDP with each increase in the unemployment rate of 1%, this implies that an increase in 
the unemployment rate of 0.5% should lead to an increase in disbursements from the EUBS 
of about 0.05% of GDP. In other words, the stabilisation impact would be limited. The 5% 
stabilisation found here is considerably less than that found in the CEPS study and what 
is reported in Beblavý et al. (2015). The key reason for this difference is that the official data 
on replacement rates do not seem to cover the wide differences in coverage rates and 
eligibility criteria, which explain the fact noted above that there is no close link between 
expenditure on the unemployed and the unemployment rate. 
2. Re-insurance schemes (i.e. schemes with a threshold) could provide more stabilisation, but 
it would be of a different nature. Small shocks might not lead to any pay-out from the 
EUBS, but a large share of bigger shocks could be offset to a great extent. Disregarding 
some statistical issues, one could say that, again as a rule of thumb rather than a precise 
calculation, up to 50% of shocks could be offset by EUBS payments if the scheme had to 
intervene in only one-in-ten cases of negative shocks. 
Are unemployment benefits a luxury good? 
The differences across member states in their expenditure on unemployment benefits are 
systematic. One observes that richer countries tend to pay proportionally higher benefits per 
unemployed person than poorer ones. Figure 3 below shows this by comparing income per 
capita on the horizontal axis to expenditure per unemployed person (again normalised by 
income per capita).   
The scatter plot of the data suggests that countries with higher incomes tend to spend more 
on their unemployed than poorer ones (the outlier is Belgium which, for the reasons 
mentioned above, is the only member state that spends, on average, more on each unemployed 
person than the GDP per capita of the country).   
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Figure 3. Unemployment benefits per unemployed person (as % of GDP per capita) 
 
Notes: The variable on the vertical axis is calculated on a per capita, or rather per beneficiary basis (total 
expenditure on unemployment benefits/number of unemployed). The euro amount spent per unemployed 
is then divided by national GDP per capita (since the euro amount of unemployment benefits must be 
compared to national average wages or income). 
Source: Own calculations based on OECD and Eurostat data.   
The simulations of the stabilising impact of an EUBS usually abstract from this de facto 
relationship between income per capita and how much countries spend on unemployment 
benefits. The current differences in expenditure patterns suggest that the fiscal consequences 
of an increase in unemployment are much stronger for higher-income countries. The 
stabilisation impact of the creation of an EUBS in terms of actual expenditure on 
unemployment might thus vary considerably across countries. Some member states might be 
over-compensated for an actual expenditure increase during a recession (unless they make 
their systems much more generous), whereas the compensation for others might only be 
partial. 
Conclusions 
Assessing only the stabilisation to be achieved through the creation of a European 
unemployment benefits scheme is very difficult. There are many potential ways in which an 
EUBS could be implemented, with profound implications for the potential stabilisation 
impact, which range from the negligible to the significant.    
A cursory analysis of actual expenditure on unemployment benefits reveals that member 
states with higher unemployment rates do not necessarily always spend more on benefits.  
Moreover, actual expenditure on unemployment benefits seems to react only minimally to 
actual increases in unemployment, at least for small cyclical variations. This suggests that, 
outside deep recessions, the fiscal importance of the variations of unemployment over the 
business cycle might have been overrated. 
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